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THE JOINDER RULES AND EQUITY JURISDICTION
IN THE AVOIDANCE OF A MULTIPLICITY
OF SUITS
Bachman v. Lembach 1
Plaintiff, an administrator de bonis non, under the authority of an order of the Orphans' Court of Baltimore City,
filed a bill in equity against four defendants for the recovery of certain property alleged to have belonged to the
decedent. The bill alleged that one of the defendants, a
sister of the decedent, had joint access to the decedent's
safe deposit box; that at the time of the decedent's death,
all the contents of the box, consisting of certain jewelry,
cash and United States Defense Savings Bonds, belonged
to the decedent; that the defendant sister opened the box
and removed its contents; that the bonds and a watch had
subsequently come into plaintiff's hands, but that the remaining jewelry and cash were in part retained by the
defendant and in part delivered by her to the other defendants. Plaintiff asked for a declaratory decree, discovery and accounting for the contents of the box, determination of the ownership thereof, an injunction and other
relief. Defendants demurred, urging that there were adequate remedies at law in actions of replevin or trover, or
for money had and received. On appeal from an order
overruling the demurrer,2 the Court of Appeals reversed
and ordered the bill dismissed, holding the legal remedies
adequate and the only ground for equitable jurisdiction the
prevention of multiple suits; in view of the Joinder Rules,
it would be unnecessary to bring more than one action at
law to determine all questions in issue, and therefore there
was no need to seek relief in equity on this ground.
Plaintiff, in contending that equity had jurisdiction over
the present controversy, relied upon the recent case of
Berman v. Leckner,3 in which the Court had held that
equity had jurisdiction of a bill by an administrator de
bonis non to recover personal property of the decedent al263 A. 2d 641 (Md. 1949).
2 In
the instant case the appeal was taken from the order overruling a demurrer to the entire bill of complaint. Such an appeal is no longer permitted.
See Rule 6A of the Court of Appeals Rules and Regulations Respecting
Appeals (published in the Baltimore Daily Record, May 24, 1950) providing:
"No appeal shall be allowed from an order overruling a demurrer to a
bill of complaint, but the ruling shall be reviewable upon appeal from
the final decree."
This rule became effective on June 1, 1950.
S188 Md. 321, 52 A. 2d 464 (1947).
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leged to have been withheld. In the Berman case the Court
said generally as to the right to proceed in equity for the
specific recovery of personal property:'
"It is a general rule that equity will 'enforce the
surrender and delivery of chattels in specie, which
have been tortiously obtained or are wrongfully detained', where they consist of heirlooms, paintings, or
other works of art having a sentimental or unique
value, or having no ready market value. 5 In Maryland,
this rule has been extended to notes and other securities.6 Whether Equity will assume a concurrent jurisdiction may depend upon the balance of convenience
in a particular case.7 Important considerations, in the
recovery of assets of any type, may be the necessity
for a discovery, the sufficiency of allegations as to
fraud or collusion, and the possibility of avoiding a
multiplicity of suits.8 In the case at bar, we think the
legal remedy would be inadequate or incomplete, and
that the equity jurisdiction is properly invoked to bring
about a recovery and redistribution of the assets in a
more expeditious and convenient manner."
However, the Court distinguished the instant case from
the Berman I case in that by the allegations of the bill there
was no showing of any peculiar value in the chattels involved, no need for discovery, nor any complication or need
for an accounting. The Court therefore concluded that the
legal remedies here were adequate, and that there was no
reason to give equitable relief except upon the ground of
preventing possible multiplicity of suits.
As to this, the Court stated that it has never been flatly
decided in Maryland whether the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits at law is an independent ground for relief in
equity, but assumed without deciding that it is. Nevertheless, the allegations in the bill show no practical necessity
for the Court's exercising its jurisdiction on this ground in
'Ibid,
326, 327.
5
Citing, Pomeroy, Spec. Perf., (3rd ed. 1926) Sec. 12; Burr v. Bloomsbury,
101 N. J. Eq. 615, 138 A. 876 (1927).
a Citing, Scarborough v. Scotten, 69 Md. 137, 14 A. 704, 9 Am. St. Rep. 409
(1888) ; Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Coyle, 133 Md. 343, 105 A. 308 (1918) ;
McIntyre v. Smith, 154 Md. 660, 141 A. 405 (1928). But see Farmer v. O'Carroll, 162 Md. 431, 160 A. 12 (1932), and Note, Specific Restitution in Equity
of Converted Stocks and Bonds, 4 Md. L. Rev. 92 (1939) ; Sykes v. Hughes,
182 Md. 396, 35 A. 2d 132, 150 A. L. R. 87 (1943).
Citing, 4 Restatement, Torts, (1939), Sec. 946.
Citing Boland v. Ash, 145 Md. 465, 477, 125 A. 801 (1924) ; Turk v. Grossman, 176 Md. 644, 667, 6 A. 2d 639 (1939).
9 Supra, ns. 3, 4.
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the instant case since under the Joinder Rules l° multiple
suits at law would not be necessary to adjudicate all the
questions in issue.
The statement by the Court that it has never flatly
decided that the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits is an
independent ground of equitable jurisdiction has been repeated subsequently in Redwood Hotel v. Korbien.11 Nevertheless in the past the Court of Appeals has stated it frequently as one of various alternate reasons for the exercise
of equitable jurisdiction. 12 And there are several cases in
which, on the facts of the cases, relief in equity seems to
have been given primarily, if not entirely, on this ground. 3
The case of Allender v. Ghingher,4 cited by the Court in
the instant case, deals with only one phase of the question
of the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits, viz., whether a
bill on this ground will lie where there is no common right,
title or interest involved, a question as to which there is
sharp conflict in the authorities. 5
Wells v. Price,6 which was also cited by the Court,
seems to be directly in point. In that case the State's Attorney of Baltimore City sought the aid of equity to restrain the Warden of the Baltimore City Jail from releasing prisoners under the state-wide law, rather than according to the local law, pertaining to the maximum period of
confinement for the nonpayment of fines and costs. During
the course of the year the issue of the case would affect
the cases of about one thousand prisoners. The jurisdiction
of equity was not challenged by counsel but the Court
nevertheless examined this point at some length, and stated
that equity will act to prevent multiple litigation, quoting
Pomeroy with approval. Though other reasons in support
of the exercise of equitable jurisdiction were given as well,
it is difficult on the facts to find any other ground for its
existence, and it would therefore seem that the case could
10General Rules of Practice and Procedure, Part Two, III, Joinder of Parties and Claims; Third Party Practice, Rule 2 (a) (d) (e), Md. Code Supp.
(1947) 2040.
73 A. 2d 468, 472 (1950).
12See Note, Power of Equity to Enjoin Trespassers to Real Property Requisites for the Granting of Such Relief, 2 Md. L. Rev. 160, 166 (1938),
and cases cited.
"See Cityco Co. v. Slaysman, 160 Md. 357, 153 A- 278 (1931) ; Baker v.
Howard County Hunt, 171 Md. 159, 188 A. 223 (1936) ; Metaxas v. Easton
Pub. Co., 154 Md. 393, 140 A. 603 (1928) ; Blondell v. Consolidated Gas Co.,
89 Md. 732, 43 A. 817 (1889) ; Townsend, Grace & Co. v. Epstein, 93 Md. 537,
49 A. 629, 86 A. S. R. 441, 52 L. R. A. 409 (1901).

" 170 Md. 156, 183 A. 610 (1936).
5See
Chafee, Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 Har. L. Rev. 1297,
1312-1321 (1932).
6183 Md. 443, 37 A. 2d 888 (1944).
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be regarded as a clear holding that the prevention of multiple litigation is an independent ground of equitable
jurisdiction.
As pointed out in the Wells 7 case, a distinction must be
made between equitable jurisdiction in the strict sense,
meaning the power to hear and determine a cause, and in
the looser sense in which it is frequently used, meaning
the desirability of exercising power in a particular case.
Where relief in equity is sought purely to avoid multiple
litigation, the question is one as to the exercise, not the
existence of equitable jurisdiction. The ground upon which
plaintiff asserts a claim to relief in equity is the inequitable
hardship to which he will be otherwise exposed by the
necessity of prosecuting or defending multiple suits at law
and the vexatious character of such multiple litigation. To
justify his claim he must consequently show that the hardship is real and outweighs the inconvenience resulting to the
defendant if equity should take jurisdiction over the cause.' 8
In the instant case, as the Court points out, the plaintiff
was not actually under any necessity of prosecuting multiple suits at law, by virtue of the Joinder Rules.' 9 As stated
by the Court:20
"the plaintiff may join in one action at law as many
legal claims as he may have against any defendant, and
17

lbid; See also Fooks v. Ghingher, 172 Md. 612, 621, 192 A. 782 (1937).
See Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56 (1903) ; Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire
Insurance Co., 296 U. S. 64 (1935) ; Boise Artesian Co. v. Boise City, 213
U. S. 276 (1909) ; Peninsular Construction Co. v. Merritt, 90 Md. 589, 45 A.
172 (1900) ; Roland Park Co. v. Hull, 92 Md. 301, 48 A. 366 (1901) ; Fingles
v. Singer, 139 Md. 535, 115 A. 795 (1921).
, Supra, n. 10. Specifically the Joinder of Parties and Claims Rules here
referred to are:
"Rule 2. Permissive Joinder of Parties and Claims.
(a) Same Parties. The plaintiff may join in one action either as independent or as alternate claims as many claims as he may have against
the defendant.
(d) Multiple Joinder. Separate claims involving different plaintiffs
or defendants or both may be joined in one action whenever any substantial question of law or fact common to all the claims will arise in the
action or for any other reason the claims may conveniently be disposed
of in the same proceeding. The claims joined may be joint, several, or
in the alternative, as to plaintiffs or defendants or both. Any person
may join in the action as a plaintiff who demands any relief on any of
the claims joined, and he need not be interested in the other claims or
in obtaining all the relief demanded. Any person may be joined as a
defendant against whom any relief is demanded on any claim, and he
need not be interested in defending against the other claims or all the
relief demanded.
(e) Judgments Among Multiple Parties. Where the action involves
more than one plaintiff or defendant or both, judgment may be given
for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to
relief and against one or more defendants according to their respective
liabilities."
Supra, n. 1, 644.
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as many separate legal claims as he may have against
more than one defendant 'whenever any substantial
question of law or fact common to all the claims will
arise in the action.' Separate judgments may be entered on the various claims. In the instant case the
parties in possession all claim title by way of gift from
the decedent, through her agent Mrs. Bachman. If they
are unable to maintain their claim, separate judgments
for the return of the jewelry and for money had and
received could be entered by the law court, against
each of the three parties in possession."
In the absence of any such necessity for prosecuting multiple suits at law, there is no inequitable hardship placed
upon the plaintiff in remitting him to his legal remedies,
and consequently no basis for the exercise of equitable
jurisdiction on the plaintiff's behalf.
As stated by Pomeroy:21
"There must be a practical necessity for the exercise of the jurisdiction. Since the existence or exercise
of the jurisdiction, in classes third and fourth, 22 depends on defects in the legal rules as to joinder of
parties, where the legal remedy is not thus defective,
but permits the joinder of the numerous parties or
consolidation of the numerous suits, equity will not
take jurisdiction for the purpose of awarding substantially the same relief that may be obtained at law."
Pomeroy goes on to state in a footnote that the statutory
provisions for interpleader, intervention, consolidation of
suits, and bringing in additional parties are all in aid of
the efficacy of the remedy afforded to the parties by the
ordinary action at law, and that these may be considered
in determining whether a suit in equity to restrain actions
at law should be entertained.23 Thus it appears that in determining whether equity will take jurisdiction over a
given controversy, consideration must be given not only to
Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. (5th ed. 1941), See. 251%.
3 is where a number of persons have separate and individual
claims and rights of action against the same party; Class 4 is where the
same party has or claims to have some common right against a number of
persons. Class 1 is where plaintiff at law is obliged to bring a number of
similar actions against the same wrong-doer. Class 2 is where one party
brings successive or simultaneous similar actions against another party, and
the defendant at law now seeks to have equity decide the controversy in one
single judicial determination.
nDavis v. Forrestal, 124 Minn. 10, 144 N. W. 423, L. R. A. 1915 F, 1012,
Ann. Cas. 1915 B, 448 (1913).
2

2Class
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the rules of equity jurisprudence, but also to the General
Rules of Practice. and Procedure. Decisions in other jurisdictions are to the same effect.2 4
However, although the plaintiff's rehiedies at law in the
instant case were adequate by the usual tests and no undue
hardship is imposed by remitting him to these, a query
might still be raised as to whether the Court's action in
decreeing dismissal of plaintiff's bill was consistent with
Art. 16, sec. 92.25 In its decision in the instant case, the
Court makes no reference to this statute; and there was no
showing in the facts of the case as to defendants' solvency
or whether there was a posting of bond. The Court does
state that in the absence of allegations in the bill it could
not assume that judgments at law would be inadequate or
ineffective. The statute, however, places the burden upon
the defendant of affirmatively showing that a judgment at
law would be effective and in the absence of such showing,
requires bond to be posted. In Universal Realty Corp. v.
Felser,2 6 which also came up on appeal from the action of
the trial court on defendants' demurrers to the bill of complaint the Court reversed a decree sustaining the demurrers
without leave to amend and remanded the case for further
proceedings, declaring:
"It may very well be that the Felsers (defendants)
are financially able to respond in damages, or can give
the proper bond, but there is nothing in the record
before us to show that this is the case. In the absence
of such a showing, relief should not be refused on the
ground that the appellant (plaintiff) had an adequate
remedy of law."
It is not apparent why this statement is not equally applicable to the instant case."
24 See, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Wert, (C. C. A. 8th Cir.),
102 F. 2d 10 (1939) ; but cf. Parkway, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co.,
314 Mass. 647, 51 N. E. 2d 436 (1943) ; Jay-Bee Realty Corp. v. Agric. Ins.
Co., 320 Ill. App. 310, 50 N. E. 2d 973 (1943).
Md. Code (1939), Art. 16, See. 92:
"No court shall refuse to issue a mandamus or injunction on the mere
ground that the party asking for the same has an adequate remedy in
damages, unless the party against whom the same is asked shall show
to the court's satisfaction that he has property from which the damages
can be made, or shall give a bond in a penalty to be fixed by the court,
and with a surety or sureties approved by the court, to answer all damages and costs that he may be adjudged by any court of competent
jurisdiction to pay to the party asking such mandamus or injunction by
reason of his not doing the act or acts sought to be commanded, or by
reason of his doing the act or acts sought to be enjoined, as the case
may be."
179 Md. 635, 641, 22 A. 2d 448 (1941).
2" See also, Michael v. Rigler, 142 Md. 125, 120 A. 382 (1926).

